Discusiones

Truth, legal statements and deontic logic

Pablo Navarro — 2025-05-26

The main objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of the tension underlying the distinction between norms and propositions for the elaboration and justification of deontic logic. Two relatively heterodox ide- as will be used as useful conjectures for this conceptual exploration. On the one hand, the difference between normative statements and propositions and, on the other hand, the propositional nature of norms. My research will be limited exclusively to the field of law (i. e., legal norms and systems) and to three different groups of questions that articulate this work: a) Are norms propositions? Do norms possess values of truth? Are propositions necessarily true or false? b) What are the differences between norms, normative statements and normative propositions? What are the truth conditions of normative statements and what relationship do they have with norms and normative propositions? c) What kind of logic would be a logic of normative statements? How would a logic of normative statements differ from a logic of normative propositions?

What is inherited, is not stolen?

Alejandro Berrotarán — 2025-05-26

This paper evaluates the institution of inheritance from a meritocratic perspective and concludes that inheritance conflicts with meritocracy in two ways. First, hereditary receptions are inherently undeserved and thus fail to adhere to a distribution criterion based on personal effort and capabilities. Second, hereditary transfers often lead to wealth concentrations that threaten the equality of opportunity essential for meritocracy. Therefore, a meritocratic legal design should abolish or significantly limit hereditary receptions.

Introductory Notes to the Discussion on J. L. Pérez Triviño’s Hartian Conception of Sport

Consuelo Reyes Crisostomo — 2025-05-26

In this introduction the most relevant elements of the Hartian concept and characterization of sport, as presented by J. L. Pérez Triviño, are discussed, along with some aspects that provoke debate or controversy in this conceptualization. Specifically, the paper reconstructs the author’s main theses, which are nuanced and/or relativized with some reservations or disagreements presented by Lojo, López Frías, García Figueroa, and Kobiela. In relation to the author’s thesis, some classic topics or problems in legal theory are introduced, which are connected to it. The presentation concludes with an explanation of the various assumptions underlying Pérez Triviño’s Hartian conception of sport.

A Hartian conception of sport

Jose Luis Pérez Triviño — 2025-05-26

A recurring theme in the philosophy of sport, and more specifically in what is now called “sport jurisprudence,” is the attempt to characterize the phenomenon of sport by focusing on its normative components. In this sense, there is a long tradition in the philosophy of sport that has characterized it in terms very similar to those used by philosophers when referring to law: formalism, conventionalism, interpretivism. In this work, I have attempted to offer a conception of sport close to H.L.A. Hart’s characterization of law. In this sense, I have emphasized the delimitation of norms that can be characterized in similar terms to Hart’s distinction between primary and secondary rules. Secondly, I have attempted to offer a conception of adjudication in sport that is closer to a Hartian conception of adjudication in law than to an interpretivist one. In other words, referees generally limit themselves to the application of the various rules and do not refer to the internal values of the sport. Except in very flagrant cases where the application of the rule contradicts a principle of sports practice, this is correct.

A Hartian conception of sport?

Francisco Javier Lopez Frias — 2025-05-26

In this critical commentary, I examine the most recent theoretical contribution by philosopher of sport and law, José Luis Pérez Triviño, namely, a Hartian conception of sport. The text comprises two parts. First, I problematize issues concerning the conceptual foundations of the conception, including its relationship to the main philosophical approaches to sport officiating. Second, I outline future avenues for developing the conception. In short, in this commentary, I elucidate conceptual issues in the philosophical literature on sport, especially those concerning officiating, and identify ways forward for Pérez Triviño’s original proposal.

A Non-Hartian Conception of Sport

Alfonso García Figueroa — 2025-05-26

This article discusses the Hartian conception of sport held by Professor José Luis Pérez Triviño. Some objections are based on my conviction that Hart’s theory of law is insufficient to provide an adequate explanation of law and therefore it is not a reliable model to extrapolate to sport. On the other hand, other objections are based on the fact that, even assuming the validity of that theory of law, its extension to sport is not entirely satisfactory.

Some Suitsian Remarks on A Hartian Conception of Sport

Filip Kobiela — 2025-05-26

The paper presents some comments on José Luis Pérez Triviño’s Hartian conception of sport. In these remarks, I will draw on the philosophy of Bernard Suits, whose thought also plays an important role in Pérez-Triviño’s consideration. In the first part, I comment on the analogy between sport and law, which is the main conceptual vehicle of Pérez Triviño’s consideration, and I point out some of the limitations of this analogy. Some of these are particularly interesting in the light of Suits’ conceptual distinctions. In the second part, I reconstruct and comment on the Pérez Triviño’s characterisation of sport. This characteristic is based on an essentialist structure that might be called the Suits-Parry model of the definition of sport. In the third part, I propose an interpretation of Suits’ formalism, that does not necessarily conflict with other theories of sport -conventionalism and interpretivism. I also reconstruct Suits’ position on adjudication in sport and compare it with the Pérez-Triviño position. It turns out that Suits’ formalism is not one of the two extremes between
which the Hartian conception of sport is to be located. In the concluding remarks, I suggest that because of the indicated links with Suits’ philosophy, there are also some important neo-Suitsian elements in Perez Trivino’s Hartian conception of sport.

On the trail of Pérez Triviño’s Hartian Conception of Sport: uncovering his ontological, epistemic and application thesis

Alba Lojo — 2025-05-26

This paper comments on the article “A Hartian conception of sport” written by Pérez Triviño for the current issue of Discusiones. Its main objective is to present the ontological, epistemological, and application the- ses contained therein in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the proposed conception. The ontological thesis presents his conception of sport as a social institution; the epistemic thesis presents his inclusive positivist account about the sources of sport, as well as his intermediate conception of the interpretation of the sources; and the application thesis shows how referees apply the rules when imposing sanctions according to Pérez Triviño. These three theses are used to analyse the variety of commitments made by the author and to point out some of his main inconsistencies.

Responses to comments to “A Hartian conception of sport”

Jose Luis Pérez Triviño — 2025-05-26

This article provides a critical and reasoned response to the comments on the proposal of a Hartian conception of sport. The author defends a characterization of sport based on its institutionalization, motor activity, and immediacy, as well as its meritocratic aim of fair distribution of goods. Key objections are addressed, such as the exclusion of chess as a sport, the analogy between law and sport, and the role of referees and judges. The article also refines the scope of judicial discretion in sport, restricting it to normative gaps and regulatory ambiguity, while rejecting an activist application based on general moral principles.