Principios-guía y leyes fundamentales en la metateoría estructuralista
Keywords:
Guiding-principles, Fundamental laws, Metatheoretical structuralismAbstract
Th e aim of the present paper is to propose a characterization of guiding-principle and fundamental law within the conceptual framework of structuralist metatheory. We point out five “necessary conditions”, “weak necessary conditions” or «symptoms» that a statement must satisfy to qualify as a fundamental law of a theory: 1) to have a cluster or synoptic character, 2) to be valid in every intended application of the theory, 3) to be quasi-vacuous (“empirically unrestricted” or, if preferred, “a priori synthetic” or even “a posteriori analytic”), 4) to have a systematizing role and 5) to possess modal force. Guiding-principles are characterized as a special kind of undamental laws, namely, as fundamental laws possesing the following additional features: to include at least one “functional” among its T-teoretical terms and to existentially quantify over it. Later on, the proposed analysis is related to the problem of the laws of nature. We conclude with the discussion of some possible counterexamples.
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