Perdonar al otro. La cuestión del sujeto entre la vida, la muerte y la sobrevida en la obra de Jacques Derrida

Abstract

The issue of the subject or subjectivity in philosophy continues to arouse important discussions and generate various reinterpretations. This article will analyze this problem in Jacques Derrida’s work. According to the Franco-Algerian philosopher, there is no such thing as a Cartesian-style “self-sufficient self.” Derrida argues that the “self” is an invention of the other: the other person, the other animal, the other absolute or God, and other forms of the event. Otherness inhabits the “self” and exceeds it, at the same time. Now, and according to the above, is it possible to continue talking about subjectivity or subject in Derrida? After deconstructing the figures of subjectivity that have emerged within the Western philosophical tradition, what is left from the subject? Is there still (a) rest? Is this a destruction of any idea of a subject or, on the contrary, after the deconstruction of the “metaphysics of presence” will a “new subject” emerge, although perhaps “subject” is no longer the right word? Derrida’s critique of the concept of life and the defense of quasi-concepts such as forgiveness, death and survival may allow us to think about a new modality of the subject.