De teoría de subastas a diseño de mercados: las contribuciones de Paul Milgrom y Robert Wilson a la economía

Autores/as

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.52292/j.estudecon.2021.2248

Palabras clave:

Subastas, diseño de mecanismos, diseño de mercados

Resumen

El premio Nobel de Economía del 2020 fue otorgado a Paul Milgrom y Robert Wilson. Ambos ganadores han realizado contribuciones seminales y cruciales a la teoría de subastas y al diseño práctico de mercados. En esta nota describimos dichas contribuciones y su significatividad dentro del contexto general de la teoría de subastas y en términos prácticos. También realizamos una revisión acerca de contribuciones sustanciales y muy influyentes de los galardonados en otras áreas de la Economía.

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Citas

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Publicado

2021-02-09

Cómo citar

Arozamena, L., Fioriti, A., & Weinschelbaum, F. (2021). De teoría de subastas a diseño de mercados: las contribuciones de Paul Milgrom y Robert Wilson a la economía. Estudios económicos, 38(76), 279–296. https://doi.org/10.52292/j.estudecon.2021.2248

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