From auction theory to market design: Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson’s contributions to Economics

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.52292/j.estudecon.2021.2248

Keywords:

Auctions, Mechanism Design, Market Design

Abstract

The 2020 Economics Nobel Prize was awarded to Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson. Both laureates have made seminal, crucial contributions to auction theory and practical market design. Here, we briefly describe those contributions and their significance within the general context of auction theory and practice. We also review the laureates’ substantial and highly influential work in other areas of economics.

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References

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Published

2021-02-09

How to Cite

Arozamena, L., Fioriti, A., & Weinschelbaum, F. (2021). From auction theory to market design: Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson’s contributions to Economics. Estudios económicos, 38(76), 279–296. https://doi.org/10.52292/j.estudecon.2021.2248

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Vol. 38 No. 76 (2021)

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