Análisis comparativo de los diferentes modelos de corrupción en subastas

Andrés Fioriti

doi:10.52292/j.estudecon.2012.762

Análisis comparativo de los diferentes modelos de corrupción en subastas

Authors

Andrés Fioriti UNS

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.52292/j.estudecon.2012.762

Keywords:

corruption, auctions, procurements

Abstract

This paper analyzes the different papers that are framed in corruption, not only in auctions but also in procurements. This survey only discusses corruption in one-dimensional auctions. The division of cases depends on the nature of the corrupt agreement, whether it is exogenous or endogenous.

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References

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Published

2012-11-02

How to Cite

Fioriti, A. (2012). Análisis comparativo de los diferentes modelos de corrupción en subastas. Estudios económicos, 29(59), 31–58. https://doi.org/10.52292/j.estudecon.2012.762

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Issue

Vol. 29 No. 59 (2012)

Section

Articles

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