Some Remarks On the Distinction Between Interpretation in abstracto and Interpretation in concreto. A Reassessment
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.52292/j.dsc.2019.2221Keywords:
Legal positivism, Interpretive skepticism, Interpretation in abstracto, Interpretation in concreto, Theories of meaningAbstract
The aim of this essay is to take stock of the great debate on Ric- cardo Guastini’s interpretive skepticism, which was published on the Issue XI (2012) of the journal Discusiones. The Author will formulate a few ideas on a particular topic of the debate: the distinction between interpretation in abstracto and interpretation in concreto. The Author will argue in favor of the following claim: the best restatement of the distinction between inter- pretation in abstracto and interpretation in concreto is grounded on a theory of meaning that defines: a) the product of an interpretation in abstracto as the sense of a normative statement; b) the product of an interpretation in concreto as the reference of a norm; c) the activity of interpretation in concreto as a stipulation of the reference through an act of ascription. In order to defend the last claim, I will rely on the notion of reference-determiner elaborated by Gillian Russell.
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