On the metatheoretical presuppositions of "The Normative Claims of Law". Possibility of error and disagreement on the concept of law.

Abstract

In this paper I propose to carry out an analysis of the book "Las pretensiones normativas del Derecho", by Paula Gaido, in which she compares the theoretical constructions of Raz and Alexy about the nature of Law. Gaido reconstructs, following these two authors, the nature of the concept of Law, its normative element and the link between Law and Morality that it implies, as questions of a conceptual nature. My aim in this essay is to critically reconstruct the notion of concept and the relation between concept -of Law- and object, which the author uses in her analysis. These notions are particularly relevant in relation to the distinction between the finished handling and minimal possession of concepts and, therefore, in the possibility of accounting for errors and disagreements about the concept of law.