Opacity and Deference: A Semantic Problem or an Epistemic One?

Abstract

In this set of comments, I intend to reflect on the scope of the semantic treatment of the opacity problems identified by Canale. For this, I will firstly reconstruct the phenomenon of opacity in the law and the problem it presents, in neutral terms with respect to semantic and epistemic theories or concepts. Secondly, I will try to show that the semantic concepts and theoretical tools used by the author (particularly that of semantic deference) do not allow us to account for the problems detected. Instead, it is necessary to appeal to epistemic distinctions. However, by doing this, the use of semantic concepts becomes unnecessary, which, I propose, exhibits the epistemic (non-semantic) character of the problem. I will conclude that although the epistemic dimension of the opacity problem should not be overlooked, the semantic notions used play an important role, since they allow to illuminate some mechanisms involved in the generation of the opacity problem.