Updating the Debate on Shapiro’s Account of Law as a Shared Plan
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.52292/j.dsc.2024.4685Keywords:
Planning Theory, Metaphysics and Legal Ontology, Normativity, Legal Authority, Scott ShapiroAbstract
In Discusiones XX there was a debate on Scott Shapiro’s theory of law as a shared plan, involving several philosophers of law, who critically read the thesis, focusing on different aspects and from different perspectives. Unfortunately, Shapiro never responded to any of the relevant criticisms of his theory. Based on the discussion generated in Discussions XX, but also considering the numerous books and articles on Shapiro’s theory of law as a shared plan that have been published, we will seek to critically analyze aspects that went unnoticed in that discussion and to evaluate new criticisms and contributions to the broad debate that ensued.
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