Los límites conceptuales de la fórmula positivista del peso de David Duarte y el modelo de las razones como alternativa
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.52292/j.dsc.2026.5467Palabras clave:
Ponderación, Proporcionalidad, Fórmula de peso, Principios, David DuarteResumen
Este articulo analiza criticamente la llamada “Formula Positivista del Peso” (FPP), propuesta por Duarte como una reformulacion de la formula del peso desarrollada por Robert Alexy. Aunque la FPP pretende ofrecer una version mas fiel a las practicas juridicas y a sus contenidos normativos, sostengo que enfrenta serias dificultades conceptuales. Tras reconstruir los fundamentos de la FPP y reconocer algunas de sus ventajas, distingo entre objeciones superables y una objecion decisiva: la naturaleza cardinal precisa de las escalas utilizadas en la formula, que reactiva con toda su fuerza la objecion de la inconmensurabilidad. Finalmente, presento de forma sucinta una propuesta alternativa: el “modelo de las razones”, basado en el aparato conceptual del razonamiento practico.
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