El sentido de la proporcionalidad
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.52292/j.dsc.2026.5482Palabras clave:
Proporcionalidad, Justificación, Balance, Doble efectoResumen
Este articulo examina la propuesta de David Duarte de sustituir la “formula del peso” de Robert Alexy por una “formula positivista” que aisla la justificacion interna (leyes sustantiva y epistemica) de toda valoracion moral. Se analiza la viabilidad de este aislamiento en la practica constitucional, donde las normas remiten a valores y principios cuyo peso debe evaluarse en contexto, y como la fase final de balance se entrelaza con las etapas de legitimidad del fin, idoneidad y necesidad. Asimismo, se cuestiona la deseabilidad de excluir la dimension moral desde la perspectiva de la cultura de la justificacion, que exige transparencia y debate publico. Finalmente, se recupera la doctrina del doble efecto para subrayar la estructura normativa en el juicio de proporcionalidad.
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Derechos de autor 2026 Chiara Valentini
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