Moral dilemmas, conflicts between rights and conflicts “for” and “in” the Law.

Abstract

In this essay I intend to resume a debate propounded ten years ago in this magazine (Discusiones, 8, 2008). That is, the discussion of an article by David Martínez Zorrilla about moral dilemmas and law, commented by José Juan Moreso, Guillermo Lariguet, Eduardo Rivera López, Daniel Mendonca and Manuel Atienza. My proposal, in essence, suggests a scheme that could serve to identify different kinds of conflicts in law. Then I try to identify which, among those situations, can be identified as dilemmas, especially in the framework of fundamental rights. For these purposes, I will raise some objections to one of the thesis of Martínez Zorrilla, but also, in a second moment, I will refer to two of his thesis that will be entirely relevant to the proposed reconstruction.