Distinctions and Paralogisms. On Guastinian Scepticism.

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to point out my disagreements with Guastini's two central theses. The first I have called "discursive segregationism thesis" and the second "moderate scepticism". With regard to the latter, the paper aims to point out the inconsistent nature of the arguments on which Guastini bases his scepticism (the omnipresent legal indeterminacy and the absence of criteria of correctness) on the one hand, and its moderate nature (the existence of prior meanings that limit interpretation) on the other. The article attempts to show that these inconsistencies make it impossible to sustain moderate scepticism in the terms in which Guastini defends it, because if the assumptions on which his scepticism is based are not abandoned, it ends up being radical (denying the existence of prior meanings); and if this moderate character is to be maintained, it is necessary to abandon the thesis of omnipresent indeterminacy together with the absence of criteria of correctness.