As To a Pure Formula: Responses to Criticisms

Authors

  • David Duarte Universidade de Lisboa

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.52292/j.dsc.2026.5453

Keywords:

Positivist Weight Formula, Matrices of Balancing, Specificationism, Balancing

Abstract

This paper contains the responses to the criticisms made in this volume to “The Positivist Weight Formula”. Broadly speaking, the main pillars of the original paper are reaffirmed, and it is additionally stressed that criticisms directed to the content of proportionality (instead of criticisms directed to the propositions presented about that content) are somehow beyond the point. Besides a new critical analysis of “Specificationism”, the paper also contains, in what concerns the incommensurability issue, matrices of balancing, trying to show that measuring gains and losses in the satisfaction of norms can be done under a comparative rational basis.

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Author Biography

David Duarte, Universidade de Lisboa

University of Lisbon, Lisbon Legal Theory, Lisboa, Portugal.

References

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Published

2026-08-19

How to Cite

Duarte, D. (2026). As To a Pure Formula: Responses to Criticisms. Discusiones, 36(1), 217–244. https://doi.org/10.52292/j.dsc.2026.5453