Moral Objectivity Without Robust Realism. Comments about Enoch

Authors

  • José Juan Moreso Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, España.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.52292/j.dsc.2015.2423

Keywords:

Impartiality, Moral objetivity, Moral realism

Abstract

In this paper I will try to defend what seems to me a strong argument in favor of the objectivity of morality and criticize what appears to me inconclusive arguments in favor of non-naturalistic moral realism. I only take care of the arguments on which Enoch defends and argues the constructive part of the book: the fundamental thesis that characterize his philosophical approach.

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Author Biography

José Juan Moreso, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, España.

Catedrático de Filosofía del Derecho. Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona.

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Published

2016-08-05

How to Cite

Moreso, J. J. (2016). Moral Objectivity Without Robust Realism. Comments about Enoch. Discusiones, 16(1), 191–219. https://doi.org/10.52292/j.dsc.2015.2423

Issue

Vol. 16 No. 1 (2015): Liberalism and Tolerance

Section

Discusiones Libros

License

Discusiones does not withhold rights of reproduction or copyright. Consequently, authors may share the final versions of publications.