On the trail of Pérez Triviño’s Hartian Conception of Sport: uncovering his ontological, epistemic and application thesis
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.52292/j.dsc.2025.4614Keywords:
Sports, Hart, Social Institutions, Sources, Interpretation, ApplicationAbstract
This paper comments on the article “A Hartian conception of sport” written by Pérez Triviño for the current issue of Discusiones. Its main objective is to present the ontological, epistemological, and application the- ses contained therein in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the proposed conception. The ontological thesis presents his conception of sport as a social institution; the epistemic thesis presents his inclusive positivist account about the sources of sport, as well as his intermediate conception of the interpretation of the sources; and the application thesis shows how referees apply the rules when imposing sanctions according to Pérez Triviño. These three theses are used to analyse the variety of commitments made by the author and to point out some of his main inconsistencies.
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