Redes optimas con costos acumulativos y comunicación bidireccional

Authors

  • Juan Manuel Larrosa Universidad Nacional del Sur
  • Fernando Tohmé Universidad Nacional del Sur

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.52292/j.estudecon.2005.883

Keywords:

Network formation games, two-way flow communication, linear network

Abstract

This work is an extension of Larrosa y Tohmé (2003)‘s approach only differing in the agents’ payoff function. This modification allows that information flows in both ways. Costs still are paid for who initiates the connection and this asymmetry reveals changes in the equilibrium topology. We find several optimal topologies as Nash equilibrium but only the sequential linear network with intermediate activation nodes as strict Nash equilibrium, i.e., agents are set in line and every intermediate agent connect with her two immediate neighbors. This way, cost acummulation is interrupted and profits are maximized.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

Berninghaus, S.K., M. Ott y B. Vogt (2004), On networks and 'stars' - Recent results in network experiments, University of Karlsruhe, mimeo.

Bala, V. y Goyal, S. (2000), "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation". Econometrica, (68), pp. 1181-1229. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00155

Dutta, B., van den Nouweland, A. y Tijs, S. (1998), "Link Formation in Cooperative Situations". International Journal of Game Theory, (27), pp. 245-255. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050070

Falk, A. y Kosfeld, M. (2003), "It's all about connections: Evidence on network formation". IEW Working Paper 21, Universität Zurich. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.390020

Goyal, S. (2004), Strong and weak links, Queen Mary University, Londres, mimeo.

Johnson, C.A. y R.P. Gilles (2000), "Spatial Social Networks". Review of Economic Design, (5), pp.273-299. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00013690

Jackson, M. y Wolinsky, A. (1996), "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks", Journal of Economic Theory, (71), pp. 44 -74. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0108

Larrosa, J.M.C. y F. Tohmé (2003), "Formación de redes dirigidas circulares con costos de enlace compartidos", Estudios Económicos XX, (41), ene-dic, pp. 27-48. DOI: https://doi.org/10.52292/j.estudecon.2003.392

Qin, C.Z. (1996), "Endogenous Formation of Cooperative Structures", Journal of Economic Theory 69: 218-226. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0047

Slikker, M., Gilles, R., Norde, H. y Tijs, S. (2002), Directed Networks, Allocation Properties and Hierarchy Formation, Center of Economic Research, University of Tilburg, mimeo.

Slikker, M. y van den Nouweland, A. (2001), "A One-Stage Model of Link Formation and Payoff Division", Games and Economic Behavior,(34), pp. 153-175. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0785

Published

2005-11-01

How to Cite

Larrosa, J. M., & Tohmé, F. (2005). Redes optimas con costos acumulativos y comunicación bidireccional. Estudios económicos, 22(45), 67–84. https://doi.org/10.52292/j.estudecon.2005.883

Issue

Section

Articles